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Abstract
Liquidity provision through its repo auctions has been one of the main in-
struments of the European Central Bank (ECB) to address the recent tensions in
ﬁnancial markets since summer 2007. In this paper, we analyse banks’ bidding
behaviour in the ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations (MROs) during the ongoing
turmoil in money and ﬁnancial markets. We employ a unique data set compris-
ing repo auctions from March 2004 to October 2008 with bidding data from 877
counterparties. We ﬁnd that increased bid rates during the turmoil can be ex-
plained by, inter alia, the increased individual reﬁnancing motive, the increased
attractiveness of the ECB’s tender operations due to its collateral framework and
banks’ bidding more aggressively, i.e. at higher rates to avoid being rationed at
the marginal rate in times of increased liquidity uncertainty.
Keywords: Central Bank Auctions, Financial Market Turmoil, Panel Sample Selec-
tion Model, Bidding Behavior, Monetary Policy Instruments
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, D44, C33, C345
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Non-technical Summary
In August 2007, ﬁnancial tension arising from investor’s concerns about the quality
of US subprime mortgages spilled over into ﬁnancial and money markets around the
world. As banks became concerned about their own liquidity position as well as the
solvency of their trading partners, money markets experienced an enormous drain of
liquidity. Subsequently, interbank market rates became more volatile and the spreads
between secured and unsecured interbank rates at term maturities rose to historical
highs posing a challenge to the smooth implementation and transmission of monetary
policy. An important instrument of the European Central Bank (ECB) to tackle these
tensions has been the liquidity provision through its reﬁnancing operations. However,
despite the signiﬁcant changes to the overall liquidity provision, banks’ bidding has
become more aggressive and volatile during the turmoil, driving up substantially ag-
gregate marginal tender rates in the ECB’s reﬁnancing operations.
In this paper, we analyse banks’ bidding behaviour during the crisis period in the
ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations (MROs). We are comparing banks’ bidding with
respect to their bid rates, i.e. the price banks are willing to pay for their liquidity,
before and during the money market turmoil observed from August 2007 onward.
We analyse the impact of collateral use, liquidity conditions related to the liquidity
supply of the ECB and liquidity needs of the banking sector as well as the conditions
in money market, such as the volatility in interest rates on banks’ bid rates. Moreover,
we investigate whether banks’ bidding diﬀers with respect to bank characteristics like
its size or its access to certain type of ECB operations. For this, we employ a unique
data set of individual bidding data of ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations (MROs)
from March 2004 to October 2008, allowing us to compare banks’ bidding behaviour
prior and during the current ﬁnancial market turmoil.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. We observe - on the one hand - that
banks’ motive to reduce their allotment uncertainty increases, i.e. banks want to avoid
being rationed at the marginal rate placing bids well above the marginal rate. On
the other hand, we observe that the number of bids below the marginal rate increases
markedly. This may imply both, banks becoming more uncertain about the marginal
rate, i.e. bidding less precise and banks bidding more opportunistically, i.e. bidding at
rates that are ex-ante unlikely to be successful. Despite this, aggregate bid rates and6
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marginal tender rates increased during the turmoil, which we can attribute to a number
of factors. First, with greater interest rate uncertainty banks wish to secure their
funds, i.e. bid at higher rates to satisfy their individual reﬁnancing needs. Second,we
ﬁnd strong evidence that the increased relative attractiveness of the Eurosystem’s
collateral framework has contributed to higher marginal tender rates. Third, banks
bid at higher rates when uncertainty over the marginal rate and their liquidity needs
increase.7
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1 Introduction
In August 2007, ﬁnancial tension arising from investor’s concerns about the quality
of US subprime mortgages spilled over into ﬁnancial and money markets around the
world. In particular, interbank market rates became more volatile and the spreads
between secured and unsecured interbank rates at term maturities became elevated
by historical standards, posing a challenge to the smooth implementation and trans-
mission of monetary policy. An important instrument of the European Central Bank
(ECB) to tackle these tensions has been the liquidity provision through its reﬁnancing
operations. However, despite the signiﬁcant changes to the overall liquidity provision,
banks’ bidding has become more aggressive and volatile during the turmoil, driving up
substantially aggregate marginal tender rates in the ECB’s reﬁnancing operations.1
The main goal of this paper is to understand increasing banks’ bid rates in the ECB’s
reﬁnancing operations during the recent turmoil, which have introduced a considerable
upward pressure on marginal tender rates. We, therefore, study banks’ bidding be-
haviour during in the ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations (MROs), comparing banks’
bidding with respect to their bid rates, i.e. the price banks are willing to pay for
their liquidity, before and during the money market turmoil observed from August
2007 onward.2 We analyse the impact of collateral use, liquidity conditions related to
the liquidity supply of the ECB and liquidity needs of the banking sector as well as
the conditions in money market, such as the volatility in interest rates on banks’ bid
rates. Moreover, we investigate whether banks’ bidding diﬀers with respect to bank
characteristics like its size or its access to certain type of ECB operations.3
There are a few strands in the theoretical literature on auctions that may help to better
understand the factors behind banks’ increased aggressive bidding. First, according to
the seminal contribution of Milgrom and Weber (1982), the valuation of the auction
1 The term ’marginal tender rate’ refers to the marginal stop out rate of the auction for central bank
liquidity conducted by the ECB. ’Aggressiveness’ in bidding refers to banks’ bidding at increased
bid rates to secure their funding.
2 In this paper, the term bid rate is used for the individual bank speciﬁc bid volume weighted average
bid rate. Hence, while a bank can bid at more than one bid rate, we only refer to a bank’s weighted
average bid rate. As the marginal rate in the ECB’s MROs is an outcome of all individual bid rates,
studying the driving forces and determinants of banks’ bidding with respect to their bid rates will
help to understand the sources behind the recently observed upward pressure on marginal tender
rates.
3 This in line with previous literature on banks’ bidding behaviour, such as Bindseil, Nyborg, and
Strebulaev (2004), Linzert, Nautz, and Breitung (2006), Linzert, Nautz, and Bindseil (2007), Craig
and Fecht (2007), and Fecht, Nyborg, and Rocholl (2008).8
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good may play a crucial role for the bidder’s willingness to pay. In the case of a
common valuation, bidders try to hedge against the ”winner’s curse”, i.e. the risk
of paying a too high price, and therefore, shade their bids in reaction to increased
uncertainty over the exact value of the auction good, see e.g. Gordy (1999) for evidence.
If, however, bidders attach a strong private value to the auction good, bidders would
bid more aggressively if the private value increases, see e.g. Hortacsu (2002). In fact
Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2004) and Bruno, Ordine, and Scalia (2005) found
only weak evidence in favor of the winner’s curse eﬀect in the ECB’s MROs. It
might appear that the demand for reserves in MROs is more closely related to the
known liquidity needs of individual banks and thus inﬂuenced less by uncertain market
conditions. In the current ﬁnancial market turmoil both interest rate uncertainty and
the liquidity needs of banks increased substantially. Therefore, banks’ reaction to this
heightened uncertainty will be informative for the speciﬁc valuation that banks attach
to the auction good, namely central bank liquidity prior and during the ﬁnancial
market turmoil.
Second, more aggressive bidding may arise from bidders anticipating the possibility
of a liquidity squeeze in the secondary market stemming, for example, from a lower
than expected supply in the auction, see Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) for details and
Fecht, Nyborg, and Rocholl (2008) for evidence. We capture the possibility of banks
being squeezed by looking at banks’ response to changing money market conditions,
the supply of liquidity in the secondary market and a measure for banks’ liquidity
uncertainty.
Third, V¨ alim¨ aki (2006) relates banks’ allotment uncertainty to more aggressive bid-
ding. Banks wish to secure their funds by bidding at higher rates to avoid rationing.
According to V¨ alim¨ aki (2006), banks’ aggressiveness in bidding increases the higher
the degree of uncertainty regarding their allotment and the higher the overall liquidity
needs of the banking sector. We can test these hypothesis by looking at banks’ bidding
in response to higher volatility in the allotment ratio and the overall volume of the
MROs.
Fourth, the occurrence of ﬁnancial tensions, according to Caballero and Krishna-
murthy (2007) may lead to decreasing risk exposures, hoarding of liquidity, and
locking-up capital reﬂecting a general ﬂight to quality. For the behaviour of banks in9
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central bank auctions these eﬀects should be particularly relevant for the speciﬁc use
of collateral.
Our analysis is based on a unique data set of 236 main reﬁnancing operation (MRO)
auctions conducted between March 2004 and October 2008.4 Bidder codes allow us
to follow bidding behavior of each of the 877 banks over time and to apply panel
econometric techniques. Following Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2004), Linzert,
Nautz, and Breitung (2006) and Linzert, Nautz, and Bindseil (2007) we look at banks’
bidding behaviour in terms of a bank’s weighted average bid rate. Since a bank’s av-
erage bid rate can only be observed if the bank actually participated in the MRO,
estimation may be subject to a selection bias, see Heckman (1979). Therefore, we ac-
count for a bank’s participation decision employing panel sample selection estimation
techniques, which extent the cross sectional Heckman (1979) approach to the panel
case.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. We observe - on the one hand -
that banks’ motive to reduce their allotment uncertainty increases, i.e. banks want
to avoid being rationed at the marginal rate placing bids well above the marginal
rate. On the other hand, we observe that the number of bids below the marginal rate
increases markedly. This may imply both, banks becoming more uncertain about the
marginal rate, i.e. bidding less precise and banks bidding more opportunistically, i.e.
bidding at rates that are ex-ante unlikely to be successful. Despite this, aggregate bid
and marginal tender rates increased during the turmoil, which we can explain by a
number of factors. First, with greater interest rate uncertainty banks wish to secure
their funds, i.e. bid at higher rates to satisfy their individual reﬁnancing needs. Second,
we ﬁnd strong evidence that the increased relative attractiveness of the Eurosystem’s
collateral framework has contributed to higher marginal tender rates. Third, banks
bid at higher rates when uncertainty over the marginal rate and their liquidity needs
increase.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section gives a short introduction in the
4 In March 2004 the ECB introduced changes to its operational framework: (i) a reduction in the
MRO maturity from two weeks to one week; and (ii) changes of ECB key interest rates become only
eﬀective with the ﬁrst MRO of a maintenance period. These changes ensured that expectations
about future policy rates should not aﬀect the determination of MRO rates, see ECB (2003) or
Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2004) for details. In October 2008 the ECB changed its auction
design to a ﬁxed rate tender full allotment procedure which marks the natural endpoint of our
sample.10
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practice of the ECB’s conduct of monetary policy operations, particularly during the
ongoing turmoil. Section 3 presents and discusses descriptive statics of the data, in-
cluding statistics related to bidding strategies and bidding success. Section 4 presents
the empirical evidence based on a panel econometric estimation. Section 5 concludes.
2 The ECB’s Implementation of Monetary Policy and
the Turmoil Period
Tender operations in the form of repurchase agreements are the predominant instru-
ment for the implementation of monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB).
Marginal tender rates govern short-term interest rates and the allotment of central
bank liquidity determines the liquidity of the European banking sector. The ECB
conducts its tender operations as weekly main reﬁnancing operations (MRO) and as
longer term reﬁnancing operations (LTRO) maturing after three months. Occasion-
ally, the ECB resorts to ﬁne tuning operations (FTO) with a maturity of one day,
mainly employed to steer the liquidity situation on the last day of a maintenance
period.
Since June 2000, the ECB has conducted its MROs as a variable rate tender.5 Banks
submit bids in terms of a volume and a price (the bid rate), subject to a minimum bid
rate set by the ECB. The auction is price discriminating, i.e. every successful bidder
pays his bid. At the marginal rate, depending on the overall bid amount, bids may
be rationed, allotting a pro rata amount to the marginal bidders of the remaining
liquidity.
To calibrate the allotment volume in the weekly MROs, the ECB takes the sum of the
expected outstanding autonomous factors (such as banknotes, government deposits
and net foreign assets) and banks’ reserve requirements. The allotment volume that
satisﬁes exactly these liquidity needs of the banking sector is called the ”benchmark
allotment”. An ECB forecast of the autonomous factors on which basis the benchmark
allotment is calculated is published prior to the bidding of banks in the MRO and on
the allotment day.
5 From 1999 to June 2000, the MROs were conducted as ﬁxed rate tenders in which banks simply bid
the amount they wish to receive at a pre-determined rate set by the ECB. However, the ﬁxed rate
tender procedure has led to massive overbidding as banks increasingly exaggerated their demand
for reserves, see Nautz and Oechssler (2003).11
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The outcome of the MRO, i.e. the liquidity supplied and the marginal rate of the
operation play a crucial role for determining short term interest rates in the interbank
market. In contrast, LTROs are always conducted as pure variable rate tenders, i.e.
without a minimum bid rate. The ECB simply accepts the allotment rates resulting
from its pre-announced supply of liquidity and the demand for LTROs submitted
by the banks. Acting as a price-taker, the ECB does not use LTROs for signaling
intended interest rate levels.
Liquidity policy in the recent turmoil
Since August 2007, the operational framework for the implementation of monetary
policy has been subject to unprecedented challenges. With rising concerns about the
quality of US subprime mortgages, investors became reluctant to hold or to further
invest in subprime mortgage related products. Banks providing liquidity lines to these
investors became concerned about their own liquidity position as well as the solvency
of their trading partners. This led to an enormous liquidity drain in the money market
accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty and distrust among counterparties in the
interbank market, culminating in a drastic widening of the Euribor-OIS spreads after
August 2007.
Central banks reacted immediately to the emerging tensions. On 9 August and the
following days, the ECB provided overnight liquidity via a series of ﬁne-tuning oper-
ations (FTOs). As the tensions persisted, the ECB provided further liquidity using
FTOs, MROs and LTROs, hence making full use of the instruments given by the
ECB’s operational framework.
Up to October 2008, the main change in the ECB’s liquidity policy had been a shift
in the supply schedule of the MROs within the maintenance period. While in the pre-
turmoil period liquidity provision in the MROs was governed by the calculated bench-
mark amount, in turmoil period more liquidity than formally needed was supplied
early in the maintenance period (i.e. allotments substantially exceeded the bench-
mark amount) and then gradually reabsorbed throughout the maintenance period by
deviating less from the benchmark when approaching the end of the maintenance pe-
riod. This implied that the overall supply of liquidity throughout the maintenance
period remained unchanged (compared to pre-turmoil times), but given banks’ prefer-12
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ences to be less exposed to liquidity uncertainty towards the end of the maintenance
period, this liquidity policy allowed banks to ’frontload’ their liquidity needs at the
beginning of the period.
In addition, relatively frequently absorbing (and occasionally) providing ﬁne-tuning
operations were conducted if the overnight rate deviated too far from the policy rate.
Furthermore, the maturity structure of the outstanding open market operations was
shifted in favour of longer term operations (so-called supplementary LTROs) at the
expense of MROs. In July 2007, just before the turmoil, 30% of all outstanding op-
erations were LTROs. This ﬁgure increased to 63% in September 2008, which is also
evident in the declining allotment volumes in the MROs as shown in Figure 2.
In the wake of the intensiﬁed market tensions and volatility following the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers, the ECB decided to change its auction procedure to ﬁxed rate
tender with full allotment for both, MROs and LTROs. The introduction of the new
tender procedure was announced on 8 October 2008. Therefore, our sample ends with
the MRO on 7 October.
3 Stylized Facts of Bidding Behaviour during the Tur-
moil Period
Our data set consists of individual bidding data of 236 main reﬁnancing operations
conducted between March 2004 and October 2008.6 The turmoil period refers to
the time period from August 2007 to October 2008. While over 6000 counterparties
fulﬁl the general conditions to participate in ECB’s reﬁnancing operations, we restrict
ourselves to 877 banks, which were participating in at least one MRO during 2006 and
2007.
3.1 Number of Bidders
With the beginning of the turmoil period the general downward trend in the number
of bidders in the MROs observed since January 2006 accelerated further. However,
starting from June 2008 a pronounced increase in the number of bidders participating
6 Note that our data set originally consisted of 238 MROs. However, we omitted the exceptional
two week ﬁxed rate tender with full allotment conducted in the penultimate week of 2008 and the
last MRO of the year overlapping with the previous MRO (and that accordingly had a negative
benchmark and was very small in volume) from our data set.13
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in MROs was observed. While the average number of bidders per MRO in the ﬁrst half
of 2007 has been around 350, this number has fallen slightly to an average of around
346 bidders during the turmoil period (see Figure 1) - however, with an average of
441 bidders per MRO auction for the period from June to October 2008.
3.2 Allotment and Bid Volumes
Aggregate bid volumes and allotment volumes in the MROs declined during the ﬁ-
nancial market turmoil as a mechanic eﬀect of the increased size of other liquidity
providing operations, mainly supplementary LTROs, see Figure 2. At the same time,
the aggregate bid volume relative to the allotment volume increased somewhat, which
is evidenced in a slight drop in the aggregate cover-to-bid ratio over the turmoil period,
see Figure 3.
3.3 Aggregate Bid Rate and EONIA
The spread between the average of the individual (volume weighted) average bid rates
and the minimum bid rate has increased signiﬁcantly, see Figure 4. While this spread
had been 5.8 basis points in the pre-turmoil period, it increased to 17.6 basis points in
the turmoil. Accordingly, the spread between the marginal rate and the minimum bid14
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Start of Turmoil
Notes: The aggregate allotment volume refers to the total allotment provided by the ECB in its
weekly MROs, while the bid volume refers to the total bid volume received by the participating
banks.
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Cover−to−Bid Ratio Start of Turmoil
Notes: The aggregate cover-to-bid ratio is constructed as the ratio of the aggregate allotment
volume and the respective total bid volume
rate - the tender spread - increased substantially to 16 basis points from 5 basis points
before the turmoil period, see Figure 5. Under ”normal”, i.e. pre-turmoil times, the
marginal tender rate settles usually below the daily overnight rate, EONIA, except
for end of maintenance period days. In the turmoil this relationship seems to have
fundamentally changed as the marginal tender rate increased and remained well above15
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Notes: The average bid rate is deﬁned as the average of all bank bid volume weighted average
bid rates.
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Tender Spread Eonia Spread
Start of Turmoil
Notes: The tender spread refers to the spread of the marginal rate over the minimum bid rate.
The EONIA spread is similarly deﬁned as the spread of the EONIA (overnight rate) over the
minimum bid rate
the EONIA. The EONIA spread declined from around 5 basis points (before the
turmoil) to -1 basis point in the turmoil period, see Figure 5.7
7 Note that the ECB aims to steer the overnight rate close to the minimum bid rate through its
liquidity operations. This explains why the overnight rate spread - steered by the ECB’s operations
- may show diﬀerent dynamics than the marginal rate of the MRO which reﬂects the prevailing
willingness to pay of the banking sector for central bank liquidity.16
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3.4 Bid Rate Dispersion and Number of Bids per Bank
The average number of bids per bank increased considerably from 1.47 in the ﬁrst half
of 2007 to more than 2 in the turmoil period with an increasing trend, see Figure 6.
Additionally, banks bid more disperse, i.e. place their bids on a wider range during
the turmoil, see Figure 7.
3.5 Aggressive and Opportunistic Bidding
Figure 8 shows that the spread between the individual (volume weighted) average
bid rates and the marginal rate increases signiﬁcantly in the turmoil period. Bidders
appear to bid more aggressively, i.e. ex post are willing to pay a considerable premium
over the marginal rate. Conversersly, it is also true that an increasing share of bids
lies consistently below the marginal rate, particularly compared to pre-turmoil times.
The fact of bids being signiﬁcantly above and below the marginal rate is conﬁrmed
by the statistics presented in Table 1 and 2, showing the share of bidders grouped by
their bid rate and their respective cover-to-bid ratio. Table 1 shows that - before the
turmoil - the bulk of banks bid above the marginal rate (70.3%) accompanied by a high
cover-to-bid ratio (average: 0.83) or full allotment. 19.6% of bidders have placed their
bid directly at the marginal rate with an average cover-to-bid ratio of 0.71. Only a few17
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Bid Rate Dispersion Start of Turmoil
Notes: The aggregate bid rate dispersion refers to the average of all banks’ volume weighted
variances of their individual bids.
bidders that participated in the ECB’s MROs bid below the marginal rate (10.1%).
In contrast, as shown in Table 2, the share of bidders that bid below the marginal
rate increases substantially in the turmoil (33.1%). Accordingly, bidding directly at
the marginal rate (only 5.3%) and above the marginal rate (61.6% compared to 70.3%
before the turmoil) declines.
Looking more closely at the bidders that were successful in the ECB’s MROs a similar
picture emerges. For this we look at banks’ allotment rate, which is deﬁned as the
individual speciﬁc volume weighted bid rate of only the successful bids, i.e. bid rates at
or above the marginal rate. The tables conﬁrm that the share of bidders that bid (from
an ex-post perspective) at the marginal rate declines signiﬁcantly in the turmoil. More
interestingly, before the turmoil most of the bidders place their bids up to one standard
deviation (2.2 basis points) above the marginal rate, which in about two thirds of the
cases yields the full allotment of their bid volume, see Table 3, Row 4. Only a small
share of bidders bid aggressively, i.e. bidding more than one standard deviation higher
than the marginal rate - in part related to the end of year eﬀect on banks’ bidding in
2004, 2005 and 2006 (around 2 basis points). During the turmoil the share of bidders
that bid aggressively, i.e. more than one standard deviation (equivalent to almost 5
basis points) above the marginal rate increased signiﬁcantly, see Table 4, Row 5. At
the same time, there is an increase of the share of bidders that submit relatively high18
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Bid Rate − Marg. Rate Start of Turmoil
Notes: The chart shows the spread between banks’ individual bid rates and the marginal rate.
For illustration, observations above the zero line point to an average bid rate of a bank that
was greater than the marginal rate, while observations below show an average bid rate below
the marginal rate. The individual bid rate of a bank refers to the bid volume weighted average
of all its individual bid rates.
Table 1: Bidder shares (in percentages) by bid rate and cover-to-bid ratio in the pre-turmoil
period from March 2004 to August 2007
Pre-Turmoil Cover/Bid=0 Cover/Bid ∈ (0,1) Cover/Bid=1
bid rate<marginal rate 3.3% 6.8% 0
bid rate=marginal rate 0 19.6% 0
bid rate>marginal rate 0 18.7% 51.6%
Notes: The table displays shares of bidders according to bidders’ bid rates (i.e. the
average volume weighted bid rate) in relation to the marginal rate. The table further
distinguishes between a bank receiving zero allotment (cover/bid=0), some allotment
(cover/bid ∈ (0,1)) and full allotment (cover/bid=1).
Table 2: Bidder shares (in percentages) by bid rate and cover-to-bid ratio in the turmoil period
from August 2007 to October 2008
Turmoil Cover/Bid=0 Cover/Bid ∈ (0,1) Cover/Bid=1
bid rate<marginal rate 23.7% 9.4% 0
bid rate=marginal rate 05 . 3 % 0
bid rate>marginal rate 0 13.3% 48.3%
Notes: The table displays shares of bidders according to bidders’ bid rates (i.e. the
average volume weighted bid rate) in relation to the marginal rate. The table further
distinguishes between a bank receiving zero allotment (cover/bid=0), some allotment
(cover/bid ∈ (0,1)) and full allotment (cover/bid=1).19
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Table 3: Bidder shares by allotment rate (i.e. only successful bids) and cover-to-bid ratio in
the pre-turmoil period from March 2004 to August 2007
Pre-Turmoil Cover/Bid ∈ (0,1) Cover/Bid=1
allotment rate=marginal rate 26.2% 0
allotment rate>marginal rate 21.2% 52,6%
allotment rate>marginal rate (up to one stdev) 21.0% 45.4%
allotment rate>marginal rate (more than one stdev) 0.2% 7.2%
Notes: The table displays shares of bidders according to bidders’ allotment rate, i.e. the average
rate a bank is charges for their successful bids. The table further distinguishes between a bank
receiving some allotment (cover/bid ∈ (0,1)) or full allotment (cover/bid=1).
Table 4: Bidder shares by allotment rate (i.e. only successful bids) and cover-to-bid ratio in
the turmoil period from August 2007 to October 2008
Turmoil Cover/Bid ∈ (0,1) Cover/Bid=1
allotment rate=marginal rate 11.6% 0
allotment rate>marginal rate 25.1% 63,3%
allotment rate>marginal rate (up to one stdev) 23.6% 42.1%
allotment rate>marginal rate (more than one stdev) 5.0% 21.1%
Notes: The table displays shares of bidders according to bidders’ allotment rate, i.e. the average
rate a bank is charges for their successful bids. The table further distinguishes between a bank
receiving some allotment (cover/bid ∈ (0,1)) or full allotment (cover/bid=1).
bids, but nevertheless do not receive full allotment (up from 0.2% to 5% during the
turmoil).
In general, these statistics point to bidders being aﬀected diﬀerently by the turmoil.
On the one hand, there seem to be bidders that are willing to pay a premium (in some
cases a substantial premium) over the marginal rate to secure their liquidity. On the
other hand, an increasing share leaves the auction empty handed bidding signiﬁcantly
below the marginal rate. This may be due to greater uncertainty about the marginal
rate, through which some bidders miss the marginal rate when bidding and, as a
consequence, falling in the close neighborhood below the marginal rate.8 However, it
may also be due to banks deliberately bidding at very low rates. These bidders place
a bid at very low rates, which would give them liquidity only in the case of a very
generous allotment by the ECB or a sudden ”normalisation” of bid rates. A possible
reason for such behaviour may be that these bidders have good access to interbank
market liquidity, which - given the that the overnight rate has been during much of
8 Note that during the turmoil the variability of the marginal rate (as measured by its standard
deviation) doubled.20
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Table 5: Bidder performance by a bank’s size















Large 0.008 0.74 0.78 0.013 0.46 0.76
Medium 0.011 0.83 0.86 0.016 0.56 0.81
Small 0.014 0.88 0.91 0.023 0.69 0.86
Notes: The allotment rate spread refers to the spread between the allotment rate, i.e. the
weighted average bid rate of the successful bids, over the minimum bid rate. The cover-to-bid
ratios are calculated based on the total bid volume (Column 3 and 6) and the bid volume of
only the successful bids (Column 4 and 7).
the turmoil period being rather close to the minimum bid rate - they receive at a
much better price than in the ECB operations. Another reason may be that these
bidders seek liquidity in the ECB auctions mainly to redistribute it to the market, i.e.
are using economies of scale and act as a money market intermediary.9 In any event,
these bidders are to a much lesser degree reliant on receiving their funding from the
ECB.
3.6 Bidder Performance by a Bank’s Size
Table 5 provides information on the bidding performance and bidding strategies of
banks grouped by their size (small, medium and large).10 11 In the pre-turmoil period,
large banks bid the closest to the marginal rate, while small banks pay the highest
premium over the marginal rate, see Table 5, Column 2. At the same time large banks
also achieve a lower overall cover-to-bid ratio than small banks, accepting thereby to
be rationed at the marginal rate more often than small banks. During the turmoil,
banks’ allotment rates, i.e. the weighted average rate of the successful bids, of all sizes
increased. The biggest increase was observed for small banks (see Column 2 and 5).
This may indicate that at least some of the small banks were hit severely by the turmoil
9 This reasoning is also supported by the fact that big banks show the biggest separation into
opportunistic and aggressive bidder, while at the same time big banks are more likely to be in an
intermediation role.
10 We group banks into three size groups according to their respective size of reserve requirements.
Small banks are those with reserve requirements below EUR 10 Mio. Banks with reserve require-
ments ranging from EUR 10 Mio to EUR 100 Mio were grouped as medium banks and banks with
reserve requirements greater than EUR 100 Mio. were classiﬁed as large banks.
11 Note that we also looked at the performance indicators for the ﬁne tuning counterparties and
EONIA panel banks. We omit the tables for the sake of brevity but can be obtained on request.21
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as their premium over the marginal rate increased signiﬁcantly. Alternatively, small
banks could have found it more diﬃcult to judge the market situation and, therefore,
to predict the marginal rate during the turmoil. The fact that overall cover-to-bid
ratios of large banks decreased the most indicates that some large banks were either
rationed at the marginal rate or going out empty handed from the operation as a
consequence of opportunistic bidding at very low rates that was more prevalent in
this group of banks, see also Section 3.5.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Estimation strategy
Since the bidder codes allow to follow the bidding behaviour of each of the 877 banks
over time (236 MRO auctions), we are able to provide econometric evidence on the
basis of panel econometric techniques. Following Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev
(2004), Linzert, Nautz, and Breitung (2006) and Linzert, Nautz, and Bindseil (2007),
we analyse banks’ bidding behaviour in terms of the weighted average bid rate. Since
a bank’s bid rate can only be observed if the bank actually participated in the MRO,
estimation may be subject to a selection bias, see Heckman (1979). Therefore, account-
ing for banks’ participation decision, we employ a panel sample selection estimation
a la Heckman (1979) to correct for a potential selection bias, see Jofre-Bonet and
Pesendorfer (2003), Linzert, Nautz, and Bindseil (2004).
In a ﬁrst step, a model on a bank’s participation decision is estimated using a panel
version of the standard probit model. In this model, the dependent variable yit equals
one if bank i participates in auction t ∈{ 1,...,N = 236} and is zero otherwise:
Pr(yit =1 |xit)=Φ ( βxit)
where xit denotes the vector of explanatory variables introduced in the previous section
and β the corresponding coeﬃcients. Φ(·) is the standard normal distribution function.
In a second step, we estimate a random eﬀects panel regression model for the censored
dependent variable, in which we include the inverse Mills ratio (obtained from the ﬁrst
step regression) to correct for the selection bias.12 Note that the inverse Mills ratio has
12 The choice of a random eﬀects model was generally conﬁrmed by a standard Hausman test. The
Hausman test indicated that the hypothesis of the individual eﬀects being uncorrelated with the
other regressors could not be rejected.22
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been highly signiﬁcant throughout all regressions giving indication for the presence of
a selection bias.
4.2 What We Want to Explain and How
In this paper our main focus is on the determinants of banks’ bid rates to explain the
sources behind elevated marginal tender rates during the turmoil period. Recall that
the spread of the average bid rate of all banks over the minimum bid rate increased
from 5.7 basis points before the turmoil to 16.4 basis points, on average, during the
turmoil. Therefore, in the following, we present results from a panel random eﬀect
regression explaining the determinants of banks’ bid rates as measured as the spread
between average volume weighted individual bid rate and the minimum bid rate (i.e.
the policy rate) as dependent variable. In our regression, we explain an individual
bank’s bid rate (as the spread over the minimum bid rate) using a set of bank and
auction speciﬁc characteristics as well as variables characterizing money market con-
ditions. In the following, the explanatory variables are introduced in more detail.
Individual bank characteristics and bank speciﬁc variables
Bank Size: As documented by earlier studies on bidding behaviour, the size of a bank
is associated with its liquidity needs and also with its sophistication in bidding, see
e.g. Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2004). We group banks into three size groups
according to their respective size of reserve requirements. Small banks are those with
reserve requirements below EUR 10 Mio. Banks with reserve requirements ranging
from EUR 10 Mio to EUR 100 Mio were grouped as medium banks and banks with
reserve requirements greater than EUR 100 Mio. were classiﬁed as large banks.
Fine tuning counterparty: We include a dummy variable for a bank belonging to
the group of banks that are eligible for the ECB’s ﬁne tuning operations. While more
than 6000 banks are eligible to participate in the MROs, only around 120 banks are
eligible for bidding in the ﬁne tuning operations. These banks are usually very active
in the money market and play an important role in their respective home markets.
EONIA panel bank: EONIA panel banks are generally to be considered as very
active in the interbank market. We include a dummy variable for a bank belonging
to the panel of banks whose data is used for the calculation of the daily EONIA rate.23
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Size of maturing allotment:T h ev a r i a b l ematuring allotment is deﬁned as the log
of a bank’s allotment received in previous week’s MRO. This variable aims to capture
the fact that banks often use the weekly MRO liquidity on a revolving basis and simply
simply roll over their outstanding balances with the central bank.
Success in prior LTRO: To investigate the relationship between alternative reﬁ-
nancing opportunities, namely the use of MROs and LTROs, we include a variable
indicating a successful allotment in the LTRO prior to an MRO (measured as the
the log of the allotment the bank received in the LTRO preceding the MRO). In case
banks see reﬁnancing in LTROs as a substitute for MRO reﬁnancing, banks should
bid signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the following MRO if successful in an LTRO.
Opt out: We try to diﬀerentiate between banks missing an auction unintentionally
and those that place their bids consistently below the (expected) marginal rate, a
phenomenon that - according to our descriptive statistics - has prevailed during the
ﬁnancial turmoil. To that end we construct a dummy variable which takes the value
one if the bank did not obtain any allotment at the last auction although it participated
and zero otherwise.
Auction characteristics
MRO size: According to V¨ alim¨ aki (2006), the size of an MRO is related to a banks’
allotment uncertainty. In his model, banks’ risk aversion related to their allotment
uncertainty arises from banks facing convex costs when actual allotment deviates
from desired allotment. Therefore the marginal cost of receiving no liquidity in the
auction is likely to increase in the size of the banks’ reﬁnancing volume which triggers
that banks bid at higher rates to avoid being rationed. In order to investigate whether
banks bid at higher rates when the MRO volume increases we incorporate the variable
MRO size that equals the log of the benchmark volume, which is known to the banks
prior to the MRO.13
Expected size of outstanding LTRO volume during the MRO week:T h e
ECB provides liquidity to the market via its MROs, LTROs and FTOs. If banks
view the liquidity provision via the various operations as completely substitutable,
13 The ECB publishes its autonomous factor forecast for the allotment of the MRO prior to the
bidding of banks, see Section 2.24
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changing the shares of the various instruments in total reﬁnancing should not matter
for banks’ bidding behaviour. If, however, banks prefer bidding in, say the MRO,
increasing the volume of the LTROs at the expense of MRO volume may increase the
competition among banks for the weekly MRO liquidity potentially resulting in higher
bid rates. We measure this possible eﬀect by the log of the LTRO volume (including
supplementary LTROs introduced with the beginning of the ﬁnancial market crisis)
outstanding during the week if the MRO tender. Since the size of the LTRO is
normally pre-announced, this measure is equal to the expected size of the outstanding
LTRO volume.
Allotment uncertainty: Banks may wish to secure their funds by bidding at higher
rates to avoid rationing. According to V¨ alim¨ aki (2006), banks’ aggressiveness in bid-
ding increases the higher the degree of uncertainty regarding their allotment and the
higher the overall liquidity needs of the banking sector. We measure banks’ perceived
uncertainty over their allotment at the marginal rate of the forthcoming auction as
the volatility of the percentage allotment ratio at the marginal rate (estimated by
an GARCH (1,1) model). This variable may also relate to banks’ fears of a liquidity
squeeze in the secondary market arising, for example, from a lower than expected
supply in the auction, see Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004).
End of maintenance period: At the end of the maintenance period reserve re-
quirements become binding, which may induce somewhat higher pressure on banks
to receive liquidity in the last auction of the maintenance period. This also entails
a higher probability for a liquidity squeeze, see Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004). We
include a dummy variable for the end of the maintenance period to account for this
eﬀect. Similarly, we include a dummy for the end of quarter and end of the year
which are usually accompanied by higher volatility in interest rates.
Money Market Conditions
Collateral premium: The costs of collateral should be of particular importance for
banks’ bidding since MRO reﬁnancing blocks collateral and makes it thus unavailable
for alternative uses over a three-month horizon. Unfortunately, there is no exact and
consistent measure of MRO collateral cost available. We, therefore, deﬁne the variable
collateral premium as the spread between the (US) one week repo rates for treasury25
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bonds to those for mortgage backed securities as an instrument. This spread measures
the opportunity cost of collateral used in the MROs and hence may reﬂect the relative
attractiveness of the ECB tender operations vis-a-vis the interbank market. Therefore,
an increase in cost of collateral related, for example, to ﬂight to quality eﬀects as
studied in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2007) might induce banks to increase their
willingness to pay in the MROs.
1 week swap spread: Banks’ willingness to pay in the MRO should be aﬀected by
banks’ expectation on future overnight rates. Therefore, we include the spread of the 1
week swap rate over the minimum bid rate as a measure of banks’ expectations of the
overnight rate over the maturity of the 1 week MRO. If market interest expectations
are high, this would naturally lead to a higher willingness to pay in the MROs.
Volatility of the EONIA swap rate: The interest rate uncertainty perceived at
the auction day is proxied by the volatility of the EONIA rate which is estimated
by a rolling 5-day average of an GARCH (1,1) model for daily observations of the 1
week EONIA swap rate. Regarding the impact of uncertainty on banks’ bidding, the
implications of auction theory are generally ambiguous. On the one hand, there is
the well-known winner’s curse eﬀect implying that banks bid more cautious when un-
certainty increases, see e.g. Milgrom and Weber (1982). With increasing uncertainty,
banks should mitigate the exposure to winner’s curse by bidding at lower rates, reduc-
ing the quantity demanded and increasing the bid rate dispersion. On the other hand,
higher uncertainty may also lead to higher bid rates and bid volumes if banks’ concern
is rather to go out empty handed, see Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2004) and
Bruno, Ordine, and Scalia (2005). In this case, higher uncertainty induces bidders to
submit larger bids at higher rates.14
EONIA market volume: Higher volumes in the interbank market may be seen as
increased liquidity needs of banks which in turn may be associated with increasing
demand pressure and hence higher bid rates in the MRO operations. To investigate
such possible interaction between reﬁnancing via the interbank market and via the
reﬁnancing operations of the ECB, we include the logged turnover of EONIA panel
banks the day before the MRO allotment as a proxy for the activity in the interbank
market.
14 This bidding behavior would also be in line with the predictions of multi-period reserve management
models, where higher interest rate risk increases banks’ demand for reserves, see Nautz (1998).26
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The estimations are conducted on a sample from March 2004 to October 2008, while
the turmoil period refers to the period from August 2007 to October 2008. Therefore,
we account for the turmoil period by including a respective dummy variable from
August 2007 onwards, but also allowing this dummy to interact with all the explana-
tory variables in the model.15 Table 6 shows the results of our regression, which are
discussed in the following section.
4.3 Regression Results
4.3.1 The Impact of Individual Bank Characteristics
Medium sized and even more so large banks bid at signiﬁcantly lower rates compared
to small banks during the turmoil. E.g. large banks bid on average 3 basis points
lower than small banks, compared to 0.4 basis points prior to the turmoil.16 Similarly,
counterparties eligible for ﬁne-tuning operations bid at lower rates during the
turmoil than banks that are not eligible to ﬁne tuning. In contrast, while EONIA-
panel banks do not bid signiﬁcantly diﬀerent under normal times, during the turmoil
EONIA panel banks bid at signiﬁcantly higher rates than non-panel banks (by 0.8
basis points).17 This may indicate that at least some of these banks were seeking
aggressively liquidity during the turmoil.
Conﬁrming our descriptive statistics, the results show that bidders that participated in
the previous auction with zero allotment bid at lower rates in the following auction and
thereby (most likely) remaining in the group of the non-successful bidders. Therefore,
it appears that a few banks essentially opt out from the operations, even though they
are still participating.
A bank’s success in the last LTRO operation has only a negligible impact on
15 We did not conduct any formal structural break test to justify this modelling strategy. However,
given the signiﬁcant changes in the time series presented in Section 3 since August 2007 and given
the signiﬁcance of the turmoil dummy and all its interactions in our regressions, we believe that
this is suﬃcient evidence for a structural break in the bidding behaviour of banks starting with the
turmoil in August 2007.
16 This is consistent with ﬁndings by Fecht, Nyborg, and Rocholl (2008) who show using German
data that large banks pay less for liquidity than small banks. Moreover, they show that smaller
banks are more vulnerable to liquidity squeezes, hence paying a higher price for their liquidity. The
authors conjecture that this relates to small banks having less good access to the interbank market
than larger banks.
17 Since EONIA banks are in their majority big banks, we checked robustness of these ﬁndings by
running the regressions with and without the EONIA panel variable and with and without bank
size, which did preserve the qualitative ﬁndings.27
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Table 6: Estimation results with a bank’s bid rate as dependent variable
Variables Pre-turmoil Turmoil
Bank specific, time constant characteristics
Eonia-panel bank -0.0041* 0.0075**
Fine-tuning counterparty -0.0052** -0.0119**
Medium sized bank -0.0034** -0.0162**
Large bank -0.0044** -0.0259**
Auction specific financial market conditions
Collateral premium 0.0014 0.0433**
Eoniavolume 0.0030** -0.0787**
Swap spread 0.6073** -0.115**
Volatility of 1 week Eonia swap 0.0006 0.0031**
Auction specific characteristics
Last MRO of MP 0.0077** -0.0122**
Benchmark amount 0.0325** -0.0473**
Expected outstanding LTRO 0.0282 0.1508**
Garch percentage allotment rate 0.0027 0.0324**
Auction and bank specifc characteristics
Maturing allotment 0.0028** 0.0061**
Allotment amount in preceeding LTRO -0.0004* -0.0016**
Optout behaviour -0.0030* -0.0413**
End of year 0.1092** 0.1092**
End of quarter -0.0078** 0.1161**
Notes: Results were obtained from a random eﬀects panel regression which includes the
inverse Mills ratio (obtained from a panel Probit regression) to correct for selection bias.
The turmoil period is accounted for by including a respective dummy variable from August
2007 onwards, but also allowing this dummy variable to interact with all the explanatory
variables in the model. The second column is the sum of the two coeﬃcients (pre-turmoil and
turmoil) in the case the interaction coeﬃcient turned out signiﬁcant. * denotes signiﬁcance
on the 10% level, while ** denotes signiﬁcance on a 5% level or smaller. A bank’s bid
rate refers to the spread between the average volume weighted bank speciﬁc bid rate and
minimum bid rate. The estimation is conducted over a sample of 236 MROs.
its bidding in the following MRO in pre-turmoil times. During the turmoil this eﬀect
slightly increased with banks bidding at somewhat lower rates in the MRO if they had
been successful in the LTRO just prior to that MRO. This may be seen as evidence
for a close relationship between LTROs and MROs in times of ﬁnancial distress in the
sense that bidding success in the LTRO may have relaxed some demand pressure of
individual banks in the MROs.
The size of the maturing allotment has a positive impact on bid rates in both
the pre-turmoil and the turmoil period, though a much stronger one in the turmoil
period. This suggests that the need to renew the obtained liquidity becomes stronger28
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in the turmoil period.
4.3.2 Potential Factors Explaining the Upward Pressure on Bid Rates
During the turmoil the collateral premium,f o rw h i c hw eu s et h es p r e a do f( U S )
one week repo rates for treasury bonds over those for mortgage backed securities as an
instrument, exhibits a signiﬁcantly positive impact on individual bid rates. According
to the regression results, a one percentage point increase in the collateral premium
increases banks’ bid rates by 0.04 basis points. Since this premium increases substan-
tially during the turmoil, this may explain a large part of the overall increase in bid
rates. This shows that with the signiﬁcant decrease in market prices for ABS collat-
eral, the ECB’s operations became relatively more attractive vis-` a-vis the reﬁnancing
via the interbank market. This seems also in line with results on the behaviour of
German banks by Craig and Fecht (2007), who ﬁnd more aggressive bidding by banks
in response to increased risk premia in the interbank market.
The overall size of the MRO potentially aﬀects banks’ bid rates in two ways: On
the one hand, the size of the MRO (as measured by the benchmark) has a positive
eﬀect on bid rates before the turmoil. In fact, in pre-turmoil times, higher MRO
volumes have been associated with increased operational risks and increased costs of
foregone allotment which induces banks to bid at higher rates to secure their funds, see
V¨ alim¨ aki (2006). On the other hand, falling MRO volumes in the turmoil period can
be associated with upward pressure on banks’ bid rates. This may be due to various
reasons. First, the increasing volume of the LTROs (via supplementary LTROs) at
the expense of MRO volume may have increased the competition among banks for
the weekly liquidity resulting in higher bid rates.18 Second, the higher prices for 3-
month liquidity observed in the LTROs may have spilled over into the MROs as banks
preferred not to resort to seek 3-month liquidity and instead retaining some ﬂexibility
with regard to their liquidity needs.
This eﬀect is conﬁrmed by the variable expected LTRO which shows that increasing
the amount of 3-month liquidity had a positive impact on bid rates in the turmoil
period. It seems to conﬁrm that substitutability between the diﬀerent types of funds
18 This is supported by the fact that the number of LTRO participants remained rather constant
(even though increasing in relative terms as the number of MRO participants has fallen slightly)
can be seen as additional evidence for the reluctance of some banks to increasingly resort to LTROs
as a source of reﬁnancing.29
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(through MROs and LTROs) seems to be limited, especially during times of money
market stress, when intermediation is severely hampered and maturity transformation
in the interbank market cannot (or only at very high premia) be obtained.
With regard to banks’ liquidity uncertainty, we can conﬁrm the theoretical predic-
tions of V¨ alim¨ aki (2006), whereby banks bid at higher rates, the more uncertain they
are regarding their allotment. In fact, we ﬁnd that banks bid at signiﬁcantly higher
bids if the uncertainty with regard their allotment volumes at the marginal rate in-
creases. This may also be related to banks’ fear of being squeezed in the secondary
market, see Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004).
Similarly interest rate volatility, as measured by the volatility of the 1 week EONIA
swap rate, has a positive impact on bid rates which becomes much stronger during
the turmoil. This can be seen as evidence for banks attaching a strong private value
to the auction good, i.e. central bank liquidity in form of reserves during the market
turmoil.19 If banks attach a higher private value to the obtained liquidity from the
central bank, i.e. banks bid for liquidity for the sake of satisfying a speciﬁc liquidity
need instead of trading this liquidity in the interbank markets, then bid rates rise
with increased interest rate uncertainty as banks wish to secure their funds and avoid
going out empty handed from the auction. It appears that this fear increases during
the turmoil inducing banks to bid at higher rates.
While before the turmoil the aggregate volume of EONIA transactions had only
a negligible impact on banks’ bid rates, decreasing volumes in the EONIA market as
observed during the turmoil are associated with higher bid rates during the turmoil.
This may be interpreted as evidence of a hampered intermediation function of the
money market during the turmoil period.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analysed a unique data set of individual bidding data of ECB’s
main reﬁnancing operations (MROs) from March 2004 to October 2008, allowing us
to compare banks’ bidding behaviour prior and during the current ﬁnancial market
turmoil.
19 See also Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2004), Bruno, Ordine, and Scalia (2005), Linzert, Nautz,
and Breitung (2006), and Craig and Fecht (2007) for pre-turmoil evidence.30
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Overall, we observe that banks place bids well above the marginal rate to avoid being
rationed. However, interestingly, we equally observe that the number of banks that
places their bids below the marginal rate, hence leaving the auction unsuccessful,
increased markedly during the turmoil. We interpret this ﬁnding that the turmoil
seems to have accentuated diﬀerences in bidding strategies. On the one hand, there
are bidders that essentially ”opt out” from the operation, bidding opportunistically at
low rates, and hence leaving the auction empty handed. Such banks could be either
seen as cash rich or as still being able to acquire suﬃcient funds at reasonable prices in
the interbank market.20 On the other hand, there are bidders that bid at signiﬁcantly
higher rates driving up overall marginal tender rates. This general increase in bid
rates in the turmoil we can explain by various factors:
First, faced with greater interest rate uncertainty, banks wish to secure their funds, i.e.
to avoid going out empty handed from the operation by bidding at higher rates. This
suggests that the valuation of the auction good as argued by Milgrom and Weber
(1982) plays a crucial role. In the case of banks’ bidding during the turmoil, the
motive to secure funds due to idiosyncratic liquidity needs becomes stronger, while at
the same time the distribution motive and hence the common value becomes weaker.
Second, we ﬁnd support for the Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) liquidity squeeze. Banks
seem to be afraid of being squeezed in the secondary market (characterized by signiﬁ-
cantly lower volumes during the turmoil) securing their funds in the ECB’s operations
bidding at higher bid rates.
Third, we conﬁrm the notion of V¨ alim¨ aki (2006) that banks bid at higher rates once
exposed to greater uncertainty about their allotment volume. Indeed the more volatile
the marginal allotment, the more banks are willing to pay for securing their allotment.
Fourth, the market tensions in ABS repo markets may explain a signiﬁcant increase
in banks’ bid rates. This can be explained by the fact that the signiﬁcant decrease in
market prices for ABS collateral increased the relative attractiveness of the Eurosys-
tem’s collateral framework vis-` a-vis the alternative of reﬁnancing via the interbank
market.
Fifth, while the overall evaluation of liquidity policy seems diﬃcult, the additional
20 Note, though that some of the bids falling below the marginal rate may also stem from banks that
bid less precise when becoming more uncertain about the marginal rate.31
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LTROs - at the expense of the MRO volumes - may have contributed to higher pres-
sure on MRO tender rates. This may stem from the potential reluctance of banks
to substitute a more ”common” source reﬁnancing such as the MROs for a less used
instrument like the LTROs in times of increased money market tensions. This re-
luctance becomes particularly relevant if the intermediation function of the money
market is hampered.
Finally, we identify signiﬁcant diﬀerences in bidding behaviour by certain bank char-
acteristics. For example, large banks bid at much lower rates than small and medium
sized banks during the turmoil. This may be explained by large banks preserving
their usual bidding advantage over small and medium sized banks in the turmoil, on
the one hand and large banks engaging into more opportunistic bidding, i.e. spreading
t h e i rb i d sm o r ew i d e l y ,o nt h eo t h e rh a n d .32
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